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[do 
The Court supported its decision 
by analogizing to prior cases. In 
Brower Vo [nyo County, 489 U.S. 
593 (1989), a driver crashed into a 
police blockade and was killed while 
fleeing from police with flashing 
sirens in a high speed car chase. The 
Court addressed the issue of whether 
the police had illegally seized the 
decedent in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. The Court concluded 
that in Brower, "[w]e did not even 
consider the possibility that a sei-
zure could have occurred during the 
course of the chase because, as we 
explained, 'show of authority' did 
not produce his stop." [d. at 1552 
(quoting Brower, 498 U.S. at 597). 
The Court also analogized the 
facts of Hodari Do to the facts of 
Hestervo United States, 265 U.S. 57 
(1924). In Hester, revenue agents 
acting without a warrant were chas-
ing moonshiners, when the 
moonshiners dropped containers. 
The containers were not excluded as 
illegally obtained evidence because, 
"[t]he defendant's own acts, and 
those of his associates, disclosed the 
jug ... and there was no seizure in 
the sense of the law when the offic-
ers examined the contents of each 
after they had been abandoned." [do 
(quoting Hester, 265 U.S. at 58). 
Relying on such prior case law, 
the Court in Hodari Do concluded 
that even if the officers did display 
ashow of authority when they chased 
the defendant, Hodari did not com-
ply and was not seized until he was 
physically tackled by the officer. 
[do The cocaine was not, therefore, 
the fruit of an illegal seizure. 
The court's holding in Hodari 
Do gives a very narrow definition of 
the word "seizure." This holding 
represents a departure from prior 
case law which defined seizure 
broadly to include, for example, elec-
tronic eavesdropping as a seizure. 
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Although the Court had the oppor-
tunity to enlarge the scope of rea-
sonable justifications for seizure, it 
chose instead to significantly limit 
the protection ofthe Fourth Amend-
ment. 
- Elizabeth Lee 
Krauss v. State: DRIVER'S 
REFUSAL TO TAKE 
BREATHAL YZER TEST 
INADMISSIBLE. 
In a 4-3 decision, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland in Krauss v. 
State, 587 A.2d 1102 (Md. 1991), 
held that a driver's refusal to take a 
Breathalyzer test was inadmissible 
when pre-test procedure and avail-
ability were not challenged. Over-
turning the drunk driving convic-
tion of Frank L. Krauss, the court 
ruled that evidence 0 fthe defendant's 
refusal to take a Breathalyzer test 
would be admissible only if mate-
rial and relevant to matters other 
than guilt or innocence. Because 
Krauss admitted he was offered a 
test and never questioned the proce-
dure by which it was tendered, the 
court concluded that the admission 
of Krauss's refusal was immaterial 
and irrelevant as to the issue of guilt 
and, therefore, inadmissible. 
Suspected of driving while in-
toxicated, Krauss was stopped by a 
state trooper. Krauss was offered 
theopportunitytotakeaBreathalyzer 
test, but he refused. At the begin-
ning of his trial, defense counsel 
made a motion in limine to exclude 
all evidence of Krauss's refusal to 
take the test, and stipulated that the 
state trooper who arrested Krauss 
followed proper procedures when 
attempting to administer the test. 
Krauss argued that his refusal to 
take the Breathalyzer test was nei-
ther material nor relevant to any 
remaining issue in the case except 
intoxication, for which it would be 
inadmissible according to Md. Code 
Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 10-309(a) 
(1989). Krauss asserted, therefore, 
that this evidence of his refusal was 
highly prejudicial and that the state 
should be prevented from using such 
evidence. The trial judge denied the 
motion, and a jury found Krauss 
guilty of driving while under the 
influence. Following his convic-
tion and sentencing, Krauss appealed 
to the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland, which affirmed the cir-
cuit court. Thereafter, the court of 
appeals granted Krauss's petition 
for a writ of certiorari. 
The court of appeals began its 
analysis by looking at the legisla-
tive enactments concerning drunk 
driving. Krauss, 587 A.2dat 1103. 
Maryland law forbids a person from 
driving any vehicle while intoxi-
cated or under the influence of alco-
hol. Md. Code Ann. Transp. § 21-
902 (1987). To facilitate the pros-
ecution of drunk drivers, Md. Code 
Ann. Transp. § 16-205. 1 (a) (1987) 
provides that any person who drives 
a vehicle on a highway is deemed to 
have consented to taking a breath 
test to determine blood alcohol lev-
els. 
The court noted that the legisla-
ture had provided for the taking of 
two types of chemical breath tests: a 
preliminary breath test and a 
Breathalyzertest. Krauss, 587 A.2d 
at 1103. The preliminary breath test 
was used as a guide for police offic-
ers in deciding whether an arrest 
should be made. [d. The results of 
the preliminary test may be used as 
evidence by the defendant but not 
by the state. [d. However, the 
results ofthe Breathalyzer test, or a 
refusal to take the test could be 
offered into evidence by the state. 
[do at 1104. Upon review of the 
transcript, the court determined that 
Krauss's refusal was for a 
Breathalyzer test. [d. at 1106. 
The provisions of Md. Cts. & 
Jud. Proc. Code Ann. §§ 10-302 
through 10-309 (1989) outline the 
proper procedures for administer-
ing the Breathalyzer test and at-
tempt to resolve questions as to its 
admissibility. Id. at 1103-05. In 
1986, the legislature amended sec-
tion 10-309(a) to permit the intro-
duction of a refusal to take the 
Breathalyzer test into evidence at 
trial, but left unchanged thatportion 
ofthe statute which stated that a jury 
could make no inferences or pre-
sumptions from that evidence con-
cerning guilt or innocence. Id. at 
1106-07. The court of appeals inter-
preted the language of section 10-
309 to mean that evidence of a re-
fusal to submitto a Breathalyzer test 
could only be applied to collateral 
matters that were not material or 
relevant to the defendant's guilt or 
innocence, such as whether the test 
was properly administered. Id. at 
1107. 
The court of appeals noted that 
Krauss clearly stated at trial that he 
would not question whether he was 
properly given the opportunity to 
take the Breathalyzer test. Id. at 
1107. Thus, the court found, ''there 
was no collateral matter in question, 
and there appeared no sound reason 
for the State to introduce evidence 
ofthe refusal except to influence the 
jury toward a verdict of guilty." Id. 
at 1107-08. 
The court of appeals rejected the 
state's argument that the admission 
of the Breathalyzer test was harm-
less error. Id. at 1108. Although the 
facts showed some evidence that 
put Krauss's sobriety into doubt, 
there was also conflicting evidence 
showing that Krauss had sustained a 
head injury. Id. The court stated 
that it was the jury's function to 
weigh the evidence. Id. at 1108. 
The court could not conclude be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the 
error in admitting the Breathalyzer 
test in no way influenced the jury's 
verdict. Id. (applying Dorsey v. 
State. 350 A.2d 665, 679 (Md. 
1976». Finally, the court ruled that 
the trial judge's brief jury instruc-
tions did not overcome the prejudi-
cial effect of admitting into evi-
dence Krauss's refusal to take the 
Breathalyzer test. Id. 
Judge McAuliffe led the dissent 
by arguing that section 10-309 was 
properly drafted to avoid misappre-
hension and speculation on the part 
of jurors. Id. at 1109. The dissent 
suggested that the legislature wrote 
section 10-309 to give the state an 
opportunity to dispel any mistaken 
belief among the jurors that the de-
fendant had no right to refuse or was 
not given the opportunity to take the 
Breathalyzertest. The dissentthere-
fore believed that admitting the 
defendant's refusal to take the test 
Lane v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. 
Co.: STATUTE OFLIMITA-
TIONS DOES NOT BEGIN TO 
RUN ON AN INSURED 
MOTORIST'S CONTRACT 
CLAIM UNTIL INSURER 
DENIES COVERAGE. 
In Lane v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. 
Co., 582 A.2d 501 (Md. 1990), the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland found 
that in a breach of contract action by 
an insured motorist against his in-
surance carrier, the three-year stat-
ute oflimitations began to run when 
the contract was actually breached 
by the insurance company when it 
denied coverage under the policy. 
The holding rejected the view es-
poused by the court of special ap-
peals in Yingling v. Phillips, 501 
A.2d 87 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985), 
that an insured's breach of contract 
action accrued when the insured mo-
would merely place the state on "a torist first discovered that the 
level playing field." Id. tortfeasor was uninsured. 
According to the decision in Mr. and Mrs. William Lane were 
Krauss, the state will no longer be involved in an auto accident when a 
able to admit evidence that a drunk vehicle driven by Guy Callaway 
driver refused to take a Breathalyzer tried to pass them on the left-hand 
test, unless the driver first calls into side of the road. As Callaway at-
question the method by which the tempted to pass the Lanes, an on-
test was administered. Only incases coming vehicle, driven by Joseph 
where the defendant claims the po- Warren and owned by Michael 
lice officer did not offer him the test McKenna, forced Callaway off the 
oritwasimproperlyperformedcould road and hit the Lanes' vehicle. The 
the evidence of his refusal then be Lanes sustained permanent injuries 
admitted. The holding in Krauss from the collision. At the time of 
severely curtails the state's ability the accident, the Lanes had an auto-
to offer evidence that the defendant mobile liability insurance policy with 
refused a Breathalyzer test. Unless Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. 
the legislature decides to amend the (Nationwide). Nationwide was in-
statute, the state has lost an impor- formed ofthe collision shortly after 
tant piece of trial evidence, tipping it occurred. 
the balance in favor of the de fen- In December of 1982, the Lanes 
dant, and, thereby resulting in fewer filed a tort action against Callaway, 
drunk driving convictions. Warren and McKenna, and notified 
- Karl Phillips Nationwideofthependingsuit. Prior 
to the filing of the tort action, the 
Lanes discovered that neither War-
ren nor McKenna had automobile 
insurance. The Lanes' attorney sent 
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